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Growth in special district governments is examined as  reason behind public sector    a   
expansion in the United States. A theoretical model is developed of the optimal mix of      
government suppliers which predicts how special district governments affect the
 t  
overall provision of government policies. The hypothesis that expansion of special
       
district governments leads to expansion of the public sector is empirically examined
    
over two time periods. 
I. I N T R O D U C T I O NINT  
There is a considerable literature on the determinants of 
pubUc sector ' This paper examines the role of 
   
li expansion.. 1   
district governments in the provision of publicspecial      
spending and debt in the United States. Created by local    
governments to provide  large variety of goods (e.g. flood   a     . .  
control, mass transportation, toll roads, bridges, credittr l, ss tr s rt ti , t ll r s, ri s, r it 
market lending), special districts have more than doubledar et le i ), s ecial istricts a e re t a  le  
(to 29487 units) in number over 1952-87. Over this same(to 29487 units) in nu ber over 1952-87. ver this sa e 
period, the number of local governments has fallen sharplyperiod, the nu ber of local govern ents has fallen sharply 
from 116000 to just over ^ These data indicate thatfro  116000 to just over 82000.82000.2 These data indicate that 
the changing composition of government units is a candi­the changing composition of government units is a candi­
date for explaining public sector expansion.date for explaining public sector expansion. 
It is commonly accepted that growth of special districts 
is related to introduction of  rules (e.g. balanced 
     
  fiscall . 
budget and tax limitation) on governments other than    
special districts. This paper develops  theoretical model of  a  
the optimal mix of government suppliers which predicts        
how  rules affect the overall supply of policy. The fiscali l l  t t  ll l   li .  
hypothesis that greater provision of services by special dis-t i  t t t  i i   i   i l i ­
tricts leads to spending and debt expansion is empiricallyt i t  l  t  i   t i  i  i i ll  
examined.i . 
1For a summary of the literature, see Borcherding (1985).'    
II. WHAT ARE SPECIAL DISTRICT
    I I  
GOVERNMENTS?? 
Public fiscall structure defines how activities are organized   
into political jurisdictions. The US public sector consists of  
federal, state local governments and isand   a complex 
arrangement of over 82000 individual governments. The   
largest is the local category which includes counties, munici­ 
palities, townships, school districts and special districts. 
Counties are found throughout the USA and municipalities  
are subdivisions within which corporations provide local  
functions aimed at specific population centres. Townships   
are mostly located in the Northeast and Midwest and pro-  ­
vide functions without regard to population concentrations.    
School districts provide the vast majority of public educa-t   ­
tion and are independent of other government .    units . 
Special districts are independent, limited-purposeli 
local governments that exist as separate legal entities with  
substantial administrative and   fiscal independence from 
general purpose (other than special district) ^ governments. 3 
Bennett and DiLorenzo (1982) argue that, in response to   
taxpayer 'revolts' of the 1970s that led to various  rules ' '    fiscal  
taxes, expenditures, debt), politicians(e.g.. . limitations on , , ,  
2The largest source of this overall centralization of the public sector stems from consolidation of school district governments. Over this^    
period, school district governments fell from about 67 000 to just under 15 000. 
3Hawaii and Alaska have very few of these governments and California and Illinois contain the largest number with each of these states'Ha i   
accounting for over 2500 of these governments.x  
9 
expanded the role of special districts in providing services to
   
constituents. They hypothesize that, since most  rules fiscal  
affect all local governments except special districts, pol-t ­
icymakers circumvent rules by diverting policies to special  
districts.  common means of circumvention is through A   
sales of non-guaranteed debt since, while balanced budget    
rules and deficit limitations exist in nearly every state, most 
rules apply only to guaranteed debt and most states forbid   
sales of non-guaranteed debt by governments other than    
special districts. 
When special district governments were found to sell 
mostly non-guaranteed debt, Bennett and DiLorenzo (1982)   
concluded that expansion of special districts lowers the     
ability of voters to scrutinize the performance of policy-  ­
makers. The percentage of debt that is non-guaranteed has     
been rising as well: 611 % (1976), 65% (1981) and 86%    
(1986).* Bunch (1991) provides empirical support for the4   
hypothesis that states with limitations on debt tend to create  
districts states limitations.more special  than   without   
Marlow and Joulfaian (1989) examine the relationship be-l   l i   i  t  l ti i  ­
tween 'on-budget' (other than special district) policies oft  ' - t' ( t r t  i l i tri t) li i  f 
state and local governments and 'off-budget' policies oft t   l l r t   ' ff- t' li i  f 
special districts. Empirical evidence suggested that, in statesi l i tri t . iri l i  t  t t, i  t t  
with relatively high on-budget expenditures, special districtit  r l ti l  i  - t it r , i l i tri t 
activities are high as well. Joulfaian and Marlow (1991a)ti iti  r  i   ll. lf i   rl  ( ) 
argue that, because  permanent causal influence runs fromr  t t,  a r t l i fl  r  fr  
on-budget to off-budget policies, the faster is past expansion- t t  ff- t li i , t  f t r is t i  
of on-budget policy, the greater policymakers substitute t li , t  t  li  tit t  
policies into off-budget entities.t  
OPTIMAL MIX OF POLICIESIII.
   P I I  
Assume that total policy has two components: on-budget  
and off-budget. Policies can be either expenditures, debt.  
issuance or any other public policies. On-budget policies are   
non-special governments offprovided  by district and of ­
budget  policies are provided by special districts. Policy  
demand is assumed to be for total policy and voters are not   
concerned about allocation between on-budget and off    of ­
budget suppliers. The primary modelling issue is therefore t  
on the supply side of policy. While technology and produc­ 
tion costs are determinants of supply, technology is not    
directly considered because of the short time span of this    
study.s 
Our focus on production costs examines costs of on-
.'
  ­
budget and off-budget inputs. The mix of these inputs is t   
assumed to be determined by policymakers whose only goal
  
is to minimize costs of producing total policy. Policymakers 
recognize substitutability between on-budget and off­of
   
   
budget inputs and would be indicated by slopes of isoquant   
curves representing combinations  of inputs yielding con­
stant levels of total policy.* Assuming  prices for inputs,  6  fixed  
an expansion path defines least cost combinations of inputs    
associated with policy expansion. 
Changes in relative input prices trace out different policy 
For example, if relative of 
  t 
expansion paths.   the
 price  
on-budget inputs rises, policymakers alter on-budget and   
off-budget combinations along flatter isocost curves. Theet    
larger the price differential change, the greater is substitu­ti l  
tion from on-budget to off-budget inputs. Flatter expansionet   
paths indicate that policy expansion is met by raising rela­  
tive usage of off-budget inputs. Other possible expansion t   
paths exist and are dependent on the substitution and in-   ­
come effects stemming from relative price changes and the 
resulting expansion path becomes  function of slopes of  a    
isoquants and magnitudes of price changes.    
Total variable costs are described by the appropriate 
expansion path and therefore increases in costs of either    
input, increase total variable costs of policy. Flatter expan­  
sion paths are associated with leftward shifts in total vari­
 
able costs and, since marginal costs increase, increases in 
total variable costs decrease the supply of policy. Similarly,
   
if the relative price of on-budget inputs rises, rising total
   
variable costs cause supply curves of policy to fall as well.
  
Notice that rising relative prices of on-budget inputs are
    
consistent with the hypothesis that off-budget expansion 
follows increased pressure
 to reduce on-budget policies. 
  t 
 
That is, if off-budget expansions are policymaker-reactions 
to taxpayer 'revolts' against expanding government, this 
 t li
 
model predicts that isocost curves facing policymakers 
become fiatter. Because  rules focus on on-budgetl  fiscall  
policies, the opportunity set describeq by a given isocost i ed,  
becomes flatter which means that, while no change occurs 
for maximum levels of off-budget inputs that may be pur- t  ­
chased, there is  reduction in maximum levels of on-budget a   
inputs that may be purchased from expenditure levels asso­  
ciated with given isocosts. In other words, imposition of   
rules are predicted to cause  leftward shift in thefiscall  a    
supply of policy.  
We now examine how a fall in supply influences total 
total are to 
 
policy. Changes in  expenditures assumed
measure policy changes. Whether expenditures rise or fall in   
response to  fall in supply depends on whether demand is a     
4Data sources: 1976 (1977 Census offGovernments Volume 4, Number 5, Table 49); 1981 (1982 Census offGovernments Volume 4, Number 2,*         
Table 10); and 1987 Censuss s of Governmentst  Volume 4, Number 2, Table 10). These percentages are averages of special district governments,  l , , ). These percentages are averages of special district governments, 
by state; i.e., averages of 50 observations.
   
sBaumol (1967) has argued that government may grow because its growing service component is not subject to the rapid technological' a       
changes that influence non-service industries. Over time, changes in technology may affect the optimal mix between on-budget and
 t   
ofT-budget inputs and exert independent influences on the supply of policy.f-       
60ur discussion assumes that on-budget inputs are plotted along the vertical axis and off-budget along the horizontal axis.*O     t   
price elastic or inelastic. Elementary price theory demon-ti . ­
strates that expenditures rise in cases of inelastic demand  
and fall in  cases of elastic demand. Policy expansion is  
therefore consistent with  falling supply when demand is a  
relatively inelastic. Studies indicate that demands for stateti . st t  
and local government policies are price inelastic and there-­
fore support the prediction that expansion of off-budgetoff-  
policies has reduced supply and led to policy ^expansion.7 
Falling within  range of — 0.25 to — 0.50 for total policy, a - 0.25 to - 0.50 for total policy, 
education and safety policies tend to be more inelastic thant  
public welfare and recreational policies.. 
IV. EMPIRICAL MODEL OF TOTAL POLICY    
From  cross-section of 48 states, the following models of a     f 
expenditure and debt policies are estimated by ordinary  
least squares: 
EX Pi =f{POPi, Yj,, DENSITYj,SITY;, RATIOhj ( OP j , I N, 
CENhU, GRANTSi, DEBTT,)j ) (1)TS j ,  
DEBi =f(POPi, Yj,i  DENSITYi, RATI02 j ,j f(POP;, SITY j , O i  
CEN2;,i, GRANTSi) (2)NTS j )  
where 
EX Pij = off-budgett +  on-budget expenditures of state   
and local governments  
DEBi = off-budget +  on-budget debt of state and local    j  t
governments 
POPij population in 1000s=  lOoo  
Yij =  per capita personal income  
DEN SITN ITYij =  percentage of population that is urban     
RATIO!i =  proportion of expenditures thatt t are off­ofI l j ti  it   
budgett 
RATIO2i = proportion of debt that is off-budget   off-I0 j 
CENlil i = proportion ofexpenditures that are at state level       
of government  
CEN2i = proportion of debt that is issued by state gov­j     
ernment  
GRANTSi = state grants to local governmentsflocal/j  
government revenuest  
DEBTij = net debt of state and local governments/state    
and local government revenues. t  
Two normalization specifications for dependent variables i    
are considered: division by gross state product (GSP) and byt   
population. Data for these policy variables are obtained t   
from the 1982 and 1987  Off-budget t     Census offGovernments.t . t 
policies are those of special districts and on-budget policiesli i  r  t  f i l i tri t   - t li i  
are those of all other state and local governments. Twor  t  f ll t r t t   l l r t .  
•'See Fisher (1988, pp. 294-95) and the references cited therein.7     
periods are considered: 1981-82 and 1986-87  years fiscali al  
and, for convenience, these two periods will be respectivelyl  r ti  
referred to as 1981 and 1986. All other data are collected  . l ll  
from Statisticall Abstractt of the Unitedi  States  and Facts and 
Figures on Government Finance and are measured in 1981  
and 1986 calendar * Units of observation are all states years.8 t  
except Alaska and Hawaii which are often excluded fromfr  
similar studies since they are often considered to be outliers.. 
RATIOl j and RATI02j measure supply variables that re­li IO i 
flect changes to expansion paths confronting policymakers
 li  
in their efforts to provide policy. For example, imposition of.  
 rules on on-budget policies cause leftward shifts infiscall   
supply. Therefore, in response to  rules on expenditures fiscall  
or debt, rising values oiRATIOU and RATI02i result fromf RATIOl j 2 j fr  
changes in least-cost combinations of on-budget and offoff­
budget inputs and, as supplies of policies shift leftward, total  
policy is hypothesized to rise when demand for policy is  
price inelastic.. 
POPj,i Yij and DENSITYNSITYi j are demand-related variables  
and are therefore hypothesized to exert positive influencesi fl  
on
 policies EX Pi and DEB j • Because it signals changesj i.  
in educational and public service needs, Musgrave and
  
Musgrave (1989) argue that rising populations are a major  
determinant of public sector activities. Fisher (1988) argues
    
that most state and local government services are normal 
goods and are usually income inelastic. As an indicator of
    
the need for infrastructure and public services, DENSITYj,t r  DENSITYi, 
is suggested by Musgrave and Musgrave (1989) as a positive 
determinant of public sector size.
   
Following the Brennan and Buchanan (1980) model of
    
Leviathan, greater centralization results in greater mono­
   
poly power which leads to expansion of public ^  policies.9 
Fiscal centralization CENli and CEN2i are therefore hypo-  j j  ­
thesized to be positively related to total policy. Based on the 
hypothesis that higher values of GRANTSi lower the financ­  j lo r the financ­
ing burden perceived by taxpayers, Winer (1983) and Logan  
(1986) report evidence that higher values of   GRANTS;NTS j ex-­
pand government. The illusion hypothesis off  fiscal  
Buchanan and Wagner (1977) argues that policymakers     
'hide' the costs of policy by raising the percentage of policy    
by budget deficits and therefore higher values offinanced      f 
DEBTiBT j are hypothesized to increase demand for policies.  
Because DEBTi and DEB; share the same numerator,T j j   
DEBTiBT j is excluded in estimation of Equation 2.     
Table 1 reports least-squares estimations of Equation 1.     
Population is never found to exert a statistically significant
   
influence on expenditures. Per capita personal income is
  t  l   
found to be a positive and significant determinant of per  i t i t f  
capita expenditures. No significant relationship is found
  i t   
between per capita personal income and total expenditures
  t  l     
*The one exception is the 1981 value for DENSITYi which is measured in 1983. This measurement year is chosen for convenience and, since8 tion  al e f r NSITYj which is measured in 1983. This measurement year is chosen for convenience and, since 
values of this variable do not change much over such short periods, this should not pose any problem for the empirical work. f    
9S ee  Joulfaian and Marlow (1991 b) for a review of the empirical literature on this hypothesis.'Se i   i    
Table 1. Estimationsti tions off totalt l expendituresitures offstatet te and  local governmentsl  ,
Dependent variable
  
Constantt 
POP  
Y  
DENSITYSITY 
RATIOI1 
CENI 
GRANTSTS 
DEBT  
l
iFR^ 
s.e.e. 
F 
n 
, ,
1986 1981 
of GSP%  f  Per capita  of GSP%  f  Per capita  
0,16.  275,38.  0.14 92.35-  
3,65.  0,27.  2,98.  0.11 
3.5E-O7-D  0,02.  2,8E-07. - D  0.01 
0,39.  1,03.  0,28.  0,86.  
1,7E-O6- . --D  0,16*.  3,OE-O6- .0E- D  0.17* 
0.80 3,26.  0,93.  3,19.  
8,9E  05.  -  -6 ,0  76.0  0.0004* 6,64**- .  
0,33.  -1 .0  0  1.95 1,60.  
0,11. *  1671,29**.  0.12* 1435,66**.  
1.94  1.32  2.10 1.50  
-0 .0  10.0  465.07 -0 .0  6  776.55 
0.17 0.30 0,87.  0.68 
0,09**.  312,18.  0,18*.  155,18- .  
1,37.  0,20.  2,83.  0.14 
0,01.  480,25**.  0,01.  368,94.  
0,90.  1.45 0,78.  1,14.  
0,06.  0.21 0.27 0,20.  
0,02.Q  487.16 0.02 388,89.  
1.47 2,81.  3,51.  2,70.  
48 48 48 48 
t-statistics below estimated coefficients. *, ** refer to significance at 5, 10% levels (one-tailed test) or
 t ,    
greater. 
Table 2. Estimations  off total  debt off state  and local governments, 
1986 1981 
Dependent variable of GSP%  Per capita of GSP%  Per capita 
Constant 0,16.  510.09 0,02.  -953,31953.  
1,79.  0,32.  0,31.  0,87.  
POP  - 4,0E-O6*. - D  0,06*- .  - 4.2E-06*.2E- D  - 0,05*.  
2,08.  1,83.  2.64 2,14.  
Y  - 8,1E-O6**.1E- D  0.06 1.6E-06- .6E- D  0,19*.  
1,32.  0.56 0.26 2.05 
DENSITYSITY 0.001* 20,70*.  0,001*.  5,03.  
RAT 102I  
2,74 
0,06* 
.
.  
1,91 
857,86* 
.
.  
2,73 
0,07* 
.  
.  
0.79 
799,11** .   
2,42.  1,92.  4,77.  3,50.  
CEN22 0,002.  202,64- .  0,09*.  568,08.  
0,03.  0,16.  1,88.  0,73.  
GRANTSS 0,14**.  1931.40 0,12.  1185,71.  
0,84.  0,64.  1,08.  0,67.  
iF 0.24 0.17 0,43.  0.31 
s.e.e. 0.05 950,59.  0,04.  620,90.  
F 3.44 2,58.  6,83.  4,51.  
n 48 48 48 48 
t-statistics below estimated coefficients. *, ** refer to significance at 5, 10% levels (one-tailed test) orf , ,     
greater. 
as a share of gross state product. Urbanization exerts a stat­ t
istically significant influence on expenditures only in 1986.
  
Policy centralization is never significantly related to expen­
ditures and, with one exception, the ratio of debt to tax 
   
 
 
revenues is not related to expenditures. Strongly significant, si ifi  
and of the hypothesized positive sign in all cases, is the share
 ,   
of off-budget policy.t . 
Table  reports least-squares estimations of Equation 2. 2   . 
Opposite to what was hypothesized, population always
 l  
and  onexerts statistically significant  negative influences  
debt. Per capita personal income is significantly related in   
two  in of the years; while hy­one or  cases  each  two ; 
pothesized to be positive, it exerts  positive and statistically a t ti  
significant influence only in 1981. Expected positive rela­ 1. 
tionships between urbanization and debt are statisticallytionships bet ee  urbaniz ti  and debt are statistically 
significant in three out of four cases. Little evidence ofsignifi t in three out of four cases. Little evidence of 
the hypothesized positive relationshiphyp t esize  positi e relatio s i  between central­the bet  central­
ization and debt issuance is found. Finally, the share ofization and debt issuance is found. inally, the share of 
off-budget debt issued by special districts exerts stronglyoff-budget debt issued by special districts exerts strongly 
significant, and, as hypothesized, positive influences in allsignificant, and, as hypothesized, positive influences in all 
cases.cases. 
V.. C O N C L U S I O N SCONCLUSIONS 
Assuming that rapid growth of special districts is  result ofi  t t r i  t   i l i tri t  is a lt  
voter-imposed constraints on on-budget policies, thet i  t i t   t li i s, t  
empirical evidence suggests that  rules cause overalli i l i  t  t t fiscali al l   r ll 
expansion of expenditure and debt policies of state andi   it   t li i   t t  a  
local governments. Several issues for future study are sug­l l t . l i   t  t   ­
gested by this paper. An important issue concerns whyt   t i  .  i t t i   
voters impose  rules primarily on on-budget policiest r  i  fiscalfi l r l  ri ril   - t li i  
since, if they wished to slow down expenditures or debti , if t  i  t  l   it r  r t 
burdens, they should impose  rules on both on-budgetr , t  l  i  fiscalfi l r l   t  - t 
and off-budgetl'- t sectors. Furthert  research on  fiscali l  thet . t  
visibility of special districts may suggest the degree to whichi i ilit   i l i t i t   t t   t  i  
voters are aware of the substitutetit t  of theset    t naturet  t  twot  
sectors.t . 
Another issue concerns the influence that special district 
governments exert on overall performance of the public  
sector. If, for example, voters do not fully recognize thatt . If,  l , t   t ll  i  t t 
special districts are, in fact, governments, voters focus atten­i l i t i t  , i  t, t , t   tt
tion on on-budget policies and thereby, when  growingti   t li i   t ,  a i  
portion of policy is delivered by ofl'-budget entities, overallrti  f li  i  li r   ff- t titi , r ll 
performance may ultimately diminish as voters increasinglyrf r   lti t l  i i i   t r  i r i l  
monitor the performance of  smaller component of totalit r t  rf r  f a s ll r t f t t l 
policy. Moreover, to the extent that voters do not perceivepolicy. oreover, to the extent that voters do not perceive 
special districts as governments, they are likely to underesti­special districts as govern ents, they are likely to underesti­
mate the true size of the public sector.ate the true size of the public sector. 
For convenience, it has been assumed that policymakersr   t  
are only motivated to minimize costs of delivering policies t     f   
to voters. This assumption is consistent with the public ti  t t   
interest view of policymakers and it may be appropriate tot f    i t   
consider how alternative assumptions, such as budget-maxi­i r  ti    
mization, alter predictions of this model. It is interesting, t r i ti  f   
that, even with a model which assumes that policymakersthat, even ith a odel hich assu es that policy akers 
are passive servants of voters, introduction of fiscalfiscal rulesare passive servants of voters, introd cti of  rules 
aimed at slowing expansion leads to public sector expansion.ai e  at slo ing expa si  leads to public sect r expansion. 
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